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Geography, Trade, and Power-Law Phenomena 
Pao-Li Chang and Wen-Tai Hsu
 
Summary and Keywords
This article reviews interrelated power-law phenomena in geography and trade. Given the 
empirical evidence on the gravity equation in trade flows across countries and regions, its 
theoretical underpinnings are reviewed. The gravity equation amounts to saying that 
trade flows follow a power law in distance (or geographic barriers). It is concluded that in 
the environment with firm heterogeneity, the power law in firm size is the key condition 
for the gravity equation to arise. A distribution is said to follow a power law if its tail 
probability follows a power function in the distribution’s right tail. The second part of this 
article reviews the literature that provides the microfoundation for the power law in firm 
size and reviews how this power law (in firm size) may be related to the power laws in 
other distributions (in incomes, firm productivity and city size).
Keywords: gravity equation, power law, firm size, city size, geography
Significance of Power-Law Phenomena and Re­
lated Reviews
Both gravity equation and power law in firm size are well documented empirical regulari­
ties (see Head & Mayer, 2015; Axtell, 2001; Luttmer, 2007; Gabaix, 2009). Because of its 
seemingly universal applicability, the power-law phenomenon that characterizes trade 
flows, incomes, firm and city sizes, and network linkages was dubbed by Krugman (1997) 
as social physics. The work by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) further 
highlights that the power coefficient in the gravity equation (i.e., the partial elasticity of 
trade with respect to variable trade cost) is one of the two sufficient statistics to impute a 
country’s welfare gains from trade for a large set of trade models. As mentioned, the pow­
er law in firm size is a key condition for the gravity equation in aggregate trade flows. 
Moreover, the heavy tail implication of the power law is also consistent with the granular 
economies phenomenon (Gabaix, 2011) (i.e., the few large firms may be what matters the 
most for macroeconomic performance). Thus, it is important to understand the plausible 
explanations for this power law in firm size to arise and how it is connected with other 
power laws.
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For an extensive review of the literature on the gravity equation, see Head and Mayer 
(2015). This survey draws insights from Head and Mayer (2015) and extends the review 
to recent developments in theoretical trade modeling. We focus on identifying the critical 
conditions that lead to a gravity equation in aggregate trade flows and discuss the gener­
al applicability of the gravity equation in these alternative models of supply/demand side 
structures. For an extensive review of power-law phenomena in economics and finance, 
see Gabaix (2009). Our survey differs from Gabaix (2009) by including recent theoretical 
explanations for the power law in firm size that do not resort to firm dynamics. In particu­
lar, we discuss theories whereby power laws emerge in static environments, due to firm 
hierarchy, networks, innovation, or geography.
Trade and Power-Law Phenomena
Gravity Equation
Since the 1960s, international trade flows (Tinbergen, 1962) have been documented to 
follow the law of gravity, where the volume of trade increases with the economic size of 
the trading partners and decreases with their distance:
with  denoting the exports from country  to country , and  and  the gross output 
and expenditure of the exporting and importing country, respectively. The distance term 
is typically interpreted as capturing all trade cost  created by geographical distance as 
well as cultural, institutional, and policy barriers (such as similarity in language, religion, 
legal origin, colonial history, regional trade agreements, currency union, and membership 
in GATT/WTO). The empirical evidence on the gravity equation is not only abundant for 
international trade but also regional trade (e.g., Duranton, Morrow, & Turner, 2014; 
Monte, Redding, & Rossi-Hansberg, 2018; McCallum, 1995; Anderson & van Wincoop, 
2003).
The empirical specification, initially thought to be an ad hoc invention until the early 
2000, has subsequently been found to be consistent with almost all canonical trade mod­
els. These include: (i) Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)—with perfect competition and 
Dixit-Stiglitz constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference for goods differentiated 
by countries of origin; (ii) Eaton and Kortum (2002)—with the Ricardian structure and 
CES preferences where countries’ productivity (z) for producing each good is character­
ized by an i.i.d. Fréchet distribution: , » ; (iii) Krugman (1980) 
—with monopolistic competition and CES preference; and (iv) Melitz (2003) and Chaney 
(2008)—with the Krugman structure along with firm heterogeneity in productivity, char­
acterized by a Pareto distribution: . By closing these models with 
(1)
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goods market-clearing conditions (as first suggested by Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003), 
they generally imply a structural gravity equation,
where  can be regarded as country ’s multilateral outward resistance to exports, as it 
is an average of country ’s bilateral trade cost  to reach each destination market  
(relative to market ’s overall resistance to imports, ), weighted by destination market 
size . Similarly,  can be regarded as country ’s multilateral inward resistance to im­
ports. The structural gravity equation in (2) extends equation (1) by down-weighting the 
absolute bilateral trade cost with these two multilateral resistance (MR) terms and link­
ing these MR terms and bilateral trade costs across countries by the structural conditions 
(3)–(4). See Head and Mayer (2015) for a detailed synthesis of this literature.
Interestingly, the gravity specification is robust to several generalizations of the above lit­
erature. For example, Bernard et al. (2003) generalized Eaton and Kortum (2002) by 
adopting Bertrand competition (instead of perfect competition). This leads to variable 
markups but nonetheless the same expression for aggregate bilateral trade (under a 
Fréchet-like productivity distributional assumption). Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) extend­
ed Melitz (2003) by adopting linear demand (instead of CES) for differentiated varieties. 
The model can also accommodate variable markups, and although the implied bilateral 
trade flow departs from the structural gravity equation (2), it follows a generalized gravi­
ty equation:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
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where  and  are exporter and importer-specific deep parameters (not limited to gross 
outputs and aggregate expenditures).
Most importantly, the trade cost factor  in the above literature often enters the gravity 
equation by a decreasing power function, where the power  corresponds to either the de­
mand-side parameter (the degree of the elasticity of substitution across goods, , net of 1) 
or the supply-side parameter (the inverse dispersion measure of the productivity distribu­
tion ). Strictly speaking, the Melitz-type model implies a gravity equation that depends 
not only on variable trade cost  but also fixed trade cost , and inclusive of both the 
extensive margin (the mass of firms that export to a destination weighted by market 
share) and the intensive margin of trade (the volume of trade at firm level). Nonetheless, 
both margins ultimately depend on variable and fixed trade costs by a power law (with 
different power functions) under a Pareto distribution for firm size, as formally shown by 
Chaney (2008).
The power  for the trade cost factor also corresponds to the (partial) trade elasticity, 
which has attracted much attention in recent quantitative trade models. As first suggest­
ed by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) (ACR), under certain restrictions, 
the trade elasticity and changes in domestic trade share (an inverse measure of trade 
openness) are sufficient statistics of a country’s welfare gain from trade (or more general­
ly, a country’s welfare change across two levels of trade openness), regardless of the un­
derlying trade models:
where  indicates the change in real income and  the change in do­
mestic trade share (e.g., ). Equation (6) holds in most of the canonical trade 
models we mentioned above that generate a gravity equation. Thus, there is a close link 
between the gravity equation and the generality of the ACR welfare formula. Once the 
condition of constant trade elasticity fails, the simple welfare-change formula of ACR in 
(6) also breaks down. Thus, whether the power law holds globally (across all levels of 
trade cost and openness) in the gravity equation is a necessary condition for using the 
ACR formula in (6) for quantitative welfare evaluation.1
In the remainder of this section, recent trade models that bear on the gravity equation 
are reviewed, with special focus on the underlying modeling assumptions that imply a 
power-law phenomenon in trade flows.
Network, Geography, and Gravity
In the canonical model of Chaney (2008), bilateral trade flows are a power function in 
variable trade cost  under the Melitz structure with Pareto productivity distribution, 
where the power  equals exactly the inverse dispersion parameter of the productivity 
(6)
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distribution . Thus, a power law in firm size implies a power law in aggregate bilateral 
trade flows under the Melitz setup with CES preferences.
Chaney (2018) instead starts with a general setup without regard to the preferences and 
proposes three sufficient conditions under which the distance elasticity of trade is con­
stant (at least for long distances). This requires more than a Pareto distribution for firm 
size (with shape parameter ), but also a line-up of firm size and the distance of firms’ ex­
ports such that the average squared distance of exports is an increasing power function 
of firm size (with a power ) and that  (such that the right tail of firm size is 
sufficiently thick and trade over long distance is dominated by exports of large firms). 
When these conditions hold, the distance elasticity tends toward . Thus, 
if the firm size follows approximately Zipf’s law , the distance elasticity is also ap­
proximately equal to one. Chaney (2018) documents that these sufficient conditions in­
deed hold for French firm-level data, and the distance elasticity  for aggregate trade is 
not statistically different from that predicted by the theory: .
Chaney (2018) then micro-founds the first two conditions by a network theory of firm-to- 
firm trade, where a firm grows bigger as its network of contacts grows along a real line 
(with the new contacts arriving at a constant rate through its existing network of con­
tacts), and as a result, exports to contacts that are further away. Firm size is measured by 
the number of contacts that a firm has. Since firms are born at a constant rate and estab­
lish new contacts at a constant rate (among their cohorts), firm size corresponds to firm 
age, and the fraction of firms above a certain age (and size) is, as a result, a power func­
tion (in the section “Micro-Foundation for Power Law in Firm Size,” we will discuss fur­
ther the mechanism under which the above assumptions give rise to the power law in 
firm size). He then uses partial differential equations to characterize how the probability 
density function of a firm’s contacts (indexed by their distance from the firm) evolves over 
time to calculate the second moment of the distance distribution. Using Fourier-trans­
form techniques to convert the density function into scalars, and the properties of convo­
lution products, he shows that it is indeed an increasing power function in firm age (size).
This paper thus provides a network micro-foundation for a power-law phenomenon in the 
firm size distribution, the average squared distance of firm-level exports, and in the geog­
raphy distribution of aggregate trade flows.
Endogenous Market Access Cost
The Melitz-Chaney model with fixed export cost and CES preferences implies a uniform 
elasticity of substitution between varieties, and hence (i) a power-law distribution of firm 
export sales, and (ii) equal growth rates of trade (in response to trade cost reduction) for 
all previously traded goods. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) demonstrated—using 
French firm-level data on exports to each destination market—that firm export sales ap­
proach Pareto distribution only at the tail of the largest firms. Meanwhile, Arkolakis 
(2010) showed that during the NAFTA liberalization episode in the 1990s, the growth rate 
of trade is larger if the initial sales of goods are lower—using data on disaggregated prod­
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uct categories. Both papers reconcile the first stylized fact by allowing for endogenous 
market access cost (instead of fixed export cost). The market access cost to reach each 
additional consumer increases (i.e., it is an increasing convex function in the total num­
ber of consumers reached). As a result, relatively unproductive firms choose to reach only 
a few consumers in a given market.
More productive firms sell more in a market at the conventional intensive margin (sales 
per consumer) but also at the new consumer margin (they endogenously choose to reach 
more consumers):
where  is the export sales of a firm with productivity level ,  is the destination 
market size,  and  are wage levels in country  and , respectively,  is the productiv­
ity cutoff to enter market j for firms from country i, and  are parameters in the 
marketing technology function. For example, a higher  implies a higher degree of con­
vexity in the marketing cost function. When , the costs to reach additional con­
sumers remain constant and the setup becomes observationally equivalent to the case of 
fixed export cost. For positive , by (7), export sales approach the Pareto distribution only 
at the upper tail (where the intensive margin dominates the new consumer margin for 
firms of sufficiently high productivities), while the export sales toward the lower tail are 
increasingly less than what is predicted by Melitz-type models with fixed export cost. 
These observations are consistent with the sales distribution of French firms in foreign 
markets documented by Eaton et al. (2011).
Given this structure, Arkolakis (2010) further demonstrates that the partial elasticity of 
firm-level trade  with respect to a change in  is decreasing in firm productivity 
levels and approaches that of the Melitz-type model  as z tends to infinity:
Thus, trade cost changes have proportionally bigger impacts on the smaller exporters in a 
given market.
Interestingly, even though trade elasticity at the firm level is not constant, the paper 
shows that to a first-order approximation, the aggregate trade flows, , are still de­
(7)
(8)
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scribed by a power-law function in the variable trade cost  with  (taking into ac­
count the intensive margin, the new consumer margin, and the new firm margin), consis­
tent with Chaney (2008). This set of papers thus provides theoretical support for the hy­
pothesis that aggregate trade flows can be approximated reasonably well by a power law, 
regardless of the micro-structures for firm-level trade, so long as the firm size follows a 
power law.
Non-Homothetic Preferences
The above literatures leave the impression that variations in the supply-side micro-struc­
tures do not substantively invalidate the power-law phenomenon of aggregate trade 
flows. The work of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also suggested that variable markups and 
non-homothetic preferences may leave this conclusion intact as well. The work of Arko­
lakis et al. (2019) (ACDR) confirmed that this is indeed the case, even in environments 
with non-CES homothetic preferences, or with non-homothetic (but directly additive) 
preferences. Bertoletti, Etro, and Simonovska (2018) (BES) further show that a setup 
with indirectly additive preferences (indirect utility functions that are additive in prices), 
but with the supply-side structure of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), will arrive at a gravity 
equation that observes the power law as well (with , the shape parameter of the 
Pareto productivity distribution). Thus, in sum, whether the preferences are CES (as in 
ACR), non-CES homothetic or directly additive non-homothetic (as in ACDR), or indirectly 
additive non-homothetic (as in BES), so long as the firm productivity follows a power law 
(i.e., Pareto distribution), the normalized aggregate trade flows  are still ex­
pressed by a power function in .
However, an important point highlighted by Arkolakis et al. (2019) and Bertoletti et al. 
(2018) is that even if the partial trade elasticity of trade cost is constant, which can in 
principle be estimated using the gravity equation, the welfare implications are not equiva­
lent across ACR, ACDR-non-homothetic, and BES-non-homothetic. In particular,
(9)
(10)
(11)
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where  is a sales-weighted average of the elasticity of markups to productivity. For exam­
ple, it is zero under constant markups as in ACR, and positive in Krugman (1979) and 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Since in models with non-homothetic preferences, the elas­
ticity of markups to productivity lies in the unit interval, , the welfare gain is 
smaller under ACDR non-homothetic preferences than ACR.2 Since , 
a more dispersed firm size distribution (smaller ) implies a potentially larger deviation.
Meanwhile,  represents the average pass-through (of cost changes to prices). When 
pass-through is high and approaches unity as in the case of ACR, the welfare implications 
are similar between BES and ACR. In general, however, it is likely that the welfare gains 
from trade liberalization are lower under BES non-homothetic preferences, given incom­
plete pass-through in the BES environment. The less elastic the demand (and the lower 
the pass-through) is, the larger the downward revision.
Caveats
In sum, the power law in aggregate bilateral trade flows turns out to be a robust theoreti­
cal regularity, as it holds under various perturbations to the supply-side and demand-side 
structures. The critical condition to guarantee this generality appears to be a power law 
in firm size, as shown by Melitz and Redding (2015), Chaney (2018), and Arkolakis et al. 
(2019). However, note that even if this class of models implies a power-law phenomenon 
in the aggregate trade flows (i.e., constant trade elasticity), they do not necessarily imply 
the same welfare effects when trade cost changes, the nature of which is sensitive to the 
preference specifications. Thus, the empirical and theoretical validity of the gravity equa­
tion is not a sufficient condition for welfare equivalence across trade models.
This section ends with another caveat, noting that the literature surveyed above has uni­
versally assumed iceberg trade cost following Samuelson (1954). The assumption of ice­
berg trade cost implies that trade cost is proportional to the quantity of production. Thus, 
with Pareto distribution of firm size/productivity, the presence of trade cost does not af­
fect the relative market share of big versus small firms. This assumption also implies that 
the same factor intensity is used in marketing/shipping and in production. Thus, it neu­
tralizes the potential effects of marketing/shipping technology on factor prices (Matsuya­
ma, 2007).
The work by Hummels and Skiba (2004) and Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2015), 
however, suggests that the reality is likely a combination of additive (per unit shipped) 
and multiplicative (iceberg) trade costs. The theoretical exploration of Sørensen (2014) 
and quantitative assessment of Irarrazabal et al. (2015) imply that reduction in additive 
(per unit) trade cost will have overall larger welfare impacts than reduction in iceberg 
trade cost of equal yield or equal impact on trade openness.
It seems plausible that with the introduction of additive (per unit) trade cost, the firm-lev­
el sales will not preserve its power law universally. Instead, the deviation from the power 
law would be larger for lower-priced (more efficient) firms since the per-unit trade cost is 
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a larger share of the consumer price for these firms. This pattern of deviation goes in the 
opposite direction from that of Arkolakis (2010) suggested by (7) and (8). One possible 
reconciliation is to introduce quality choice by firms such that more efficient firms also 
produce higher-quality and higher-priced varieties. This would plausibly help preserve 
the power law of firm sales for larger firms and the gravity equation at the aggregate for 
long distances as in Arkolakis (2010) and Chaney (2018). These speculations are subject 
to validations by future work.
Micro-Foundation for Power Law in Firm Size
The above survey demonstrates the instrumental role of power law in firm size in gener­
ating the power-law phenomena in trade flows (gravity equation). It is thus important to 
understand the theoretical underpinnings of power laws in firm size. This section reviews 
the recent literature on this topic. Readers are referred to Gabaix (2009) for an extensive 
survey of the earlier literature. This article focuses on the connections of recent explana­
tions for the power law in firm size with geography and trade, whenever appropriate.
Firm Dynamics
The classic explanation for the power law in firm size, or sometimes more specifically, 
Zipf’s law (a power law with a tail index of 1), is developed from the perspective of firm 
dynamics. It has a long tradition dating back to Gibrat (1931), who asserted that the rate 
of growth of firm size is independent of size. That is, the growth rate of firms of different 
size, as a random variable, follows the same distribution. Such a mathematical statement, 
dubbed “Gibrat’s law,” a law concerning growth of firm sizes, can be translated into geo­
metric Brownian motion:
where  is the firm size,  is a Brownian motion without drift, and  and  are constants. 
Denote a Brownian motion with drift as . Then, the change of the Brown­
ian motion is normally distributed by applying the central limit theorem to the random- 
walk representation with infinitesimal steps . Because , changes in 
 over a finite time interval  follow a normal distribution. In other words, changes in 
 in a finite time interval  follow a log-normal distribution with mean  and 
variance . An immediate implication is that the limiting distribution of  when  goes 
to infinity does not exist. Nonetheless, if there is a reflection barrier for xt as a lower 
bound, then the limiting distribution for  exists and is given by a power law.3 For a con­
cise exposition of the above, see chapter 3 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Because Brownian 
motion is essentially the continuous version of a random walk with infinitesimal steps, 
there are also discrete processes (e.g., the Kesten process) that generate power laws in a 
similar fashion.
(12)
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It is well known that the power law also holds for city size distribution with a tail index 
near one.4 Gabaix (1999) identifies the condition under which Zipf’s law for city size 
emerges, and he shows this with both a Brownian motion and a Kesten process and em­
beds these into a simple urban model. For the firm size distribution, Luttmer (2007) was 
the first to derive Zipf’s law in a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics, in contrast 
to the previous literature that focused on probability processes that led to a power (or 
Zipf’s) law. See, for example, Simon and Bonini (1958), Steindl (1965), and Ijiri and Si­
mon (1964).
In Luttmer (2007), there are shocks to both demand and productivity, and if both shocks 
are assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion, then firm size also follows geometric 
Brownian motion. Here, the shock to demand can be interpreted as changes in “quality.” 
His economic mechanism features firm entry, exit by selection, and firm growth. Incum­
bent firms need to pay a fixed cost to keep operating, and when some incumbent firms’ 
quality augmented productivity falls too low, they exit. Entrant firms can imitate the in­
cumbents by randomly sampling an incumbent and obtaining the scaled-down productivi­
ty of this incumbent (hence it is an imperfect imitation). As both types of firms grow at a 
similar rate, there exists a balanced growth path in which both types of firms exist. There 
is a “return process” in the model that plays the role of a reflection barrier. The “return 
process” exists because firms exit when their quality augmented productivity is below 
some barrier and enter at a point above this barrier. The stationary firm size distribution 
on the balanced growth path is a gamma distribution with a power law right tail, where 
the tail index depends on the parameters of the model. He shows that when the entry 
costs are high or that imitation is difficult, the resulting tail index is close to one (his data 
indicate a tail index of 1.06 for the U.S. firm-size distribution), and this seems to be con­
sistent with the fact that U.S. entrant sizes are typically small.
The intuition for his result is as follows. Note first that when a power law approaches 
Zipf’s law, the mean firm size grows without bound. Then, because firm profitability is 
tied to size, the fact that entrants attempt to imitate a randomly sampled incumbent ties 
the expected gains from entry to the average size of incumbents. In equilibrium, entry 
cost must be high so that it can compensate the high expected gains that reflect the large 
firm size of top firms (fat tails!). All of these are relative to the continuation cost for the 
incumbent firms (fixed cost). In short, this paper specifies clearly in economics what it 
takes in a model of firm dynamics to entail a distribution with very large mean that is con­
sistent with a power-law generating process (i.e., geometric Brownian motion). Later, 
Luttmer (2012) considered different imitation mechanisms and shows that Zipf’s law still 
holds in a mechanism where entrants can make only small improvements over the tech­
nologies used by the least productive incumbents. This echoes Luttmer’s (2007) condition 
that entry or imitation is difficult, but under this alternative mechanism both entry and 
exit rates are high, as observed in the data. For other economic models of firm dynamics 
based on the random growth mechanism, see also Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) and 
Acemoglu and Cao (2015).
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The literature that explains the power or Zipf’s law using firm dynamics is appealing in 
its economic mechanism and its generality in the sense that it can potentially be extended 
to the power-law phenomena in other objects or fields. Nevertheless, this approach relies 
strongly on Gibrat’s law, whose validity is not without a question (see, e.g., Stanley et al., 
1996; Rossi-Hansberg & Wright, 2007).5 From the perspective of this article, if power law 
in firm size leads to a gravity equation in international and regional trade flows, one 
might expect it to be related to geography and trade as well. Few studies in the firm-dy­
namics literature incorporate trade and geography. In addition, one might also expect the 
power law in firm size to be related to that in city size, as cities are made of firms and al­
so firms’ major markets. Finally, one might also expect the power law in firm size to be re­
lated to that in income, which is also a documented empirical regularity. The following 
sub-sections review recent developments in the literature that incorporate these different 
angles without resorting to Gibrat’s law.
Static Explanations: Networks, Firm Hierarchy, and Innovation
Trade Networks
The degree distribution of a network is known to exhibit a power law. If links among 
nodes are formed randomly with each pair of nodes having the same probability of link­
ing, such a random graph does not entail a power law. A “scale-free network” is one type 
of graph in which the probabilities of forming links are proportional to the degrees (sizes) 
of the nodes. This process of link formation is also known as preferential attachment. See, 
for example, Barabási and Albert (1999). In some sense, this is similar to random growth 
because under preferential attachment, the bigger nodes have similar growth rates in de­
grees to the smaller nodes as the process goes on. In the economics literature, Chaney 
(2014) is a prominent example that applied preferential attachment to explain the power 
law in firm size and explained how this is linked to geography and exports.
Specifically, using French firm-level data, Chaney finds two stylized facts to motivate his 
theory. First, if a firm exports to a larger number of countries, then it is more likely to en­
ter still more countries in the future. Second, where a firm’s exports today affect the loca­
tions to which the firm will export goods in the future, since the firm will tend to export to 
places near its current export destination. Here, “near” could mean either geographic 
proximity or larger trade linkage. These facts prompted him to develop a model for trade 
networks.
The model Chaney provides features a discrete set of locations where distances between 
locations can be defined. There is a search friction so that a firm needs to search for its 
customers (could be other firms) via either a local search or a remote search. A search is 
local when the firm searches from its own location, whereas a search is remote when it 
starts from the firm’s existing customers’ locations. While the local search is similar to a 
random attachment that forms a random graph, the remote search is similar to the pref­
erential attachment that is the basis of a scale-free network. As the model features both 
types of searches, he shows that asymptotically the number of consumers (which is the 
measure of firm size in that paper) exhibits a power-law tail. Note, however, that the num­
Geography, Trade, and Power-Law Phenomena
Page 12 of 26
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, ECONOMICS AND FINANCE (oxfordre.com/economics). (c) Ox­
ford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see 
Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
date: 27 February 2020
ber of consumers is essentially the number of contacts/links, and does not map directly 
into sales or employment, so there is a lack of intensive margin in this model. While the 
empirical firm-size distribution is based on either sales or employment, whether or not 
considerations of the intensive margin would distort the result is unresolved in Chaney 
(2014).
As discussed in the subsection Network, Geography, and Gravity, Chaney (2018) showed 
how the gravity equation can arise from a combination of three conditions: (1) a power 
law in firm size, (2) the average squared distance of exports following an increasing pow­
er function in firm size, and (3) a restriction on the relative magnitude of the two power 
parameters. Chaney (2018) micro-founds the first two conditions using a modified model 
of Chaney (2014), which does away with the local search, and provides aggregate proper­
ties of trade (in addition to firm-level ones). He shows that if Zipf’s law in firm size holds, 
then the distance elasticity of the gravity equation will be one . Also note that the 
basis for both the power law in firm size and the gravity equation in this framework is the 
preferential attachment in the network formation, and geography provides the link be­
tween the two. The model is appealing in that the second condition is independent of par­
ticular geography, and hence the results are robust to technological progress in trans­
portation or changes in national borders.
Firm Hierarchy
Following the seminal “problem-solving” model of Garicano (2000) to explain the hierar­
chy within a firm, related theoretical and empirical studies flourished. See, for example, 
Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), 
Bloom et al. (2014).6 The model features a “bottom” layer of production workers who own 
certain basic skills/knowledge and engage in day-to-day production work. However, prob­
lems that are beyond the knowledge of production workers arise from time to time, and 
the workers pass these problems “up” to a layer of managers, whose time is used for 
problem solving. If there are problems more difficult to solve than what this layer of man­
agers can handle, these problems are then passed to the next higher layer of managers. 
This model generates a pyramidal firm structure in which the higher the layer, the more 
capable the managers are in problem solving. The pyramidal structure stems from the 
fact that more difficult problems do not occur as often, and hence the number of man­
agers in higher layers is lower. If skill is defined as the difficulty of the problem, and if 
skill is costly to obtain, then the pyramidal structure will be even more pronounced. Natu­
rally, wages for higher-echelon layers of managers are higher. One naturally wonders 
whether this kind of pyramidal structure would in any way become a fractal structure so 
that power law in wages/income (also a well-known empirical regularity) can be ex­
plained.7 Nevertheless, such a fractal structure approach to explain power laws using a 
pyramidal firm hierarchy has not appeared yet.
Instead, Geerolf (2017) presents a modified version of the Garicano model with manager- 
worker matching and explains both the power laws in firm size and wage/income using a 
“power law change of variable close to the origin” technique that has been used in the 
physics literature (e.g., Jan et al., 1999; Sornette, 2002; Sornette, 2006; Newman, 2005).8 
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Formally, suppose that two variables s and t have a reciprocal relationship, , 
and s has a positive probability density around the origin, . Then, the 
probability density of t exhibits a power law (in its right tail) as
That is, a power law (in the right tail) for  only requires that , but 
otherwise  can take on any functional form.9
The setup of Geerolf (2017) assumes that the skills of agents are distributed on a continu­
um , with . Start with a two-layer firm hierarchy. There exists a cutoff 
 so that a type of manager  is matched with a type of worker . The 
difficulty of a problem is distributed uniformly in [0,1]. So, a worker of type x can solve x 
fraction of the problems arising from the production process on his/her own, and passes 
the  fraction of the problems to his/her manager whose type is denoted as . To help 
the workers with the  fraction of problems, the manager needs to spend  units of 
time for each problem. With the labor endowment of the manager normalized to one, the 
number of workers that a manager of type  can supervise (i.e., the span of control) is 
then . In this worker-manager matching model, a manager represents a 
firm, and because a firm with a manager of type  can solve  fraction of the problems, its 
output is also y per production worker. Thus, the total output of this firm is . This 
model then features an assortative matching so that a type 1 manager is matched with a 
type  worker, and a type  manager is matched with a type  worker.
As firm size is measured by the span of control, he shows that when , a power law 
in firm size emerges with a tail index of 2. For a quick intuition, first note that when 
, the support for skills  becomes infinitesimal, which means that the man­
agers are supervising very capable workers. But it does not require much time to super­
vise these workers, and hence the span of control becomes large. Formally, the  term 
in the span of control  tends to zero and  becomes arbitrarily large. 
Since the density of  is uniform, the “power law change of variables close to the ori­
gin” can be applied, and a power law emerges. In fact, the uniform assumption is 
stronger than necessary. As mentioned, all that is asked is that the density of  near ze­
ro be bounded away from zero. Geerolf then generalizes his model to a setup with multi­
ple layers , where the span of control of the top managers becomes a multiplication of 
the span of controls of the lower layers. This implies a fatter tail than the two-layer case 
with a tail index of . Thus, when  to, Zipf’s law is obtained.
From the optimal choice of the matching process, , where  denotes the 
payoff function. This is because the difference in the payoff/income  across different 
managers equals the additional output  per worker multiplied by the number of work­
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ers . In the many-layer case, the income of a top-level manager  is given 
by
Since  approximately follows Zipf’s law when  is large, the distribution of the top in­
come becomes a power law with a tail index of 2.
Innovation
Firm size is closely linked to productivity. For example, prominent firm-heterogeneity 
models such as Melitz (2003) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) assume Pareto and Fréchet 
productivity distributions, respectively, and both models entail a power-law tail in firm 
size because of these assumptions. An obvious question, then, is why should the underly­
ing heterogeneity among firms be Pareto or Fréchet distributed? (or more specifically, 
have a power-law tail?). Chen, Hsu, and Peng (2018) provided an explanation for both the 
power laws in productivity and firm size in a rather standard general-equilibrium model 
of trade. Their model is the same as that of Melitz (2003), except that an innovation stage 
is added so that productivity is endogenously determined by the firm given its innate ca­
pability. The capability of a firm is inversely modeled as its probability of failure in con­
ducting R&D experiments. Since higher productivity induces lower prices and larger 
sales, a more capable firm devotes more resources to conduct R&D experiments to obtain 
higher productivity. This article’s key finding is that power laws in both productivity and 
firm size emerge under general underlying heterogeneity of firms. The mathematical 
mechanism is again the “power law change of variable close to the origin.” That is, it only 
asks that there be a sufficient mass of top firms in the sense that the distribution of fail­
ure probability in R&D experiments needs to have a positive and finite density around ze­
ro. Moreover, the power laws hold in a general open-economy environment where almost 
all parameters are allowed to be country specific.
Besides the underlying firm heterogeneity, this article also generalizes the preference and 
technological constraints compared with standard trade models. The power laws for both 
productivity and firm size survive when the demand and innovation cost functions are 
both regularly varying. For example, this includes CES and many non-CES and non-homo­
thetic preferences on the demand side, and general polynomial functions for the innova­
tion cost.
Geography and Power Laws
While Chaney (2018) provides a unified framework to think about geography, trade, and 
the power law phenomena, the role of geography is limited to providing a link between 
the gravity equation and the power law in firm size. As power laws emerge from scale- 
free structures, such as scale-free growth processes (Kesten processes or Brownian mo­
tion), scale-free networks, or more generally fractal structures, one wonders whether ge­
ography itself can provide a fractal structure that forms the basis of a power law. In other 
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Figure 1.  A central place hierarchy.
words, Chaney’s mechanism for generating the power laws is still based on preferential 
attachment in network formation, rather than any geographic/spatial fractal structure. In 
particular, could the power law in cities (a salient phenomenon in geography) be linked 
with the power law in firm size in some way?
Hsu (2012) provided a theory that generates the power laws in both city size and firm 
size. His model is a modern formalization of the original central place theory of 
Christaller (1933) via a firm entry model with a continuum of goods. Central place theory 
describes a hierarchy of cities and towns that emerges from homogeneous plains of farm­
ers, who are the base consumers for the goods and services that firms produce (while 
farmers focus on agriculture). The two main properties of this theory are the hierarchy 
and central place properties. The hierarchy property states that if a good of certain de­
gree of scale economies is produced at a location, then all goods with lower degrees of 
scale economies are also produced in the same location. The central place property states 
that in a hierarchy of cities, a next-layer city is located in the middle of the two neighbor­
ing larger-sized cities.
When both properties hold, such a hierarchy of cities is called a central place hierarchy. 
See Figure 1 for a depiction of this hierarchy. Here, the vertical axis is the commodity 
space, and each good is indexed by , where  represents the degree of scale 
economies of the good (in his model,  is the fixed cost of production). Layer-1 cities are 
those producing all goods ; layer-2 cities are those producing all goods up to ; lay­
er-i cities are those producing all goods up to . Thus, a layer-i city can be defined by the 
top good  it produces, and the hierarchy property implies that a layer-  city must 
be smaller than a layer-i city.
Central place theory was first developed as an abstraction of the pattern that Christaller 
conceived as the hierarchy of cities and towns on the plain of southern Germany. In the 
modern-day economy, the so-called farmers can be broadly interpreted as those who are 
tied to extraction of natural resources and hence do not move around. Also, the validity of 
central place ideas does not depend on whether these “primary” industries represent a 
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large or small share of the economy. The theory works as long as there exist immobile 
people who are spread over the entire geographic space.
Even though central place theory has been a key building block of economic geography, it 
has been praised for its deep economic insight but criticized for its lack of microfounda­
tion (see, e.g., Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 1999B). Attempts to provide microfoundation 
include Eaton and Lipsey (1982); Quinzii and Thisse (1990); Fujita, Krugman, and Mori 
(1999A); Tabuchi and Thisse (2006); Tabuchi and Thisse (2011); Hsu (2012); Hsu, 
Holmes, and Morgan (2014); and de Palma et al. (2019). In particular, Hsu (2012) derived 
both hierarchy and central place properties in the same framework. His unique contribu­
tion is to provide an explanation for both power laws in city size and firm size by central 
place theory.10 The mechanism of the paper is explained in two steps as follows.
First, he explains how a central place hierarchy emerges. The model invokes a firm-entry 
mechanism that is based on spatial price discrimination (Lederer & Hurter, 1986). In such 
a mechanism, firms deliver goods to different locations, and in each location, firms en­
gage in Bertrand competition. Thus, the resulting price is the second-lowest “delivered 
marginal cost” (unit cost of production and unit transport cost that increases with dis­
tance). Such a competition mechanism implies that firms that enter and survive are equal 
distances apart. Importantly, since goods differ in their degree of scale economies, the 
firms that produce goods with higher degrees will be further apart in the geographic 
space because they need larger market areas to survive. Such firms with larger market 
areas are also the larger firms. Thus, the differences in the degrees of scale economies 
are translated into a hierarchy of firms. With a small positive externality among firms 
(such as shared consumers in the production location if workers are hired in that loca­
tion), the hierarchy property emerges because firms producing different goods tend to be 
located in the same place, and those firms producing goods with higher degree of scale 
economies appear in fewer locations. Because of the fact that competing firms are equal 
distances apart, a central place property emerges when the hierarchy property is already 
in place.
Second, a central place hierarchy as seen in Figure 1 is already similar to a fractal struc­
ture except that the density of goods in terms of the degree of scale economies is left 
open. Hsu (2012) showed that when the density function is regularly varying at the origin 
(i.e., only for goods with small-scale economies), then the power laws for both city and 
firm sizes emerge. A brief account for the mechanism is as follows. The size of a city is 
proportional to its total production, which is positively related to the range of goods it 
produces and the market areas of the goods in different subranges. Naturally, a layer-i’s 
city size is proportional to the sum of the production across all subranges  for all 
. If the density function is regularly varying around the origin, then city size  
becomes a geometric series that is proportional to  for some constant . In such 
a city hierarchy with , ranks and sizes of cities and firms are approximately log- 
linearly related (i.e., the power laws). Hsu shows that the condition on the above-men­
tioned density is weak since it includes many well-known and widely used distributions 
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(See his Table C1 in Hsu, 2012). In other words, with this mild condition, a central place 
hierarchy becomes a fractal structure, and the two power laws follow.11
Even though the paper engages in more discussion about cities, it is important to note 
that in this model, the hierarchy of cities and the hierarchy of firms are exactly the same 
thing except they are viewed from different angles.12 In particular, firm size and geogra­
phy are linked by the fact that larger firms serve larger market areas. This also echoes 
the empirical and theoretical findings in Chaney (2018).
Network and City Size Distribution
So far, our discussions surround the power law in firm size. Nevertheless, given the previ­
ous discussion on the link between geography, city size, and firm size, it is also important 
to note a recent theory connecting geography and city size distribution by Berliant and 
Watanabe (2018). Their paper proposes a theory in which scale-free transportation net­
works a lá Barabási and Albert (1999) give rise to power laws in city size, and they show 
that the estimated model generates city sizes that are sufficiently close to the actual city 
size distribution.
The model is simple and can be briefly described here. The number of cities in the econo­
my is fixed at , with the city size (population/labor) of city  denoted as . Each city pro­
duces a distinct good, and individual utility function is a Cobb-Douglas one with each of 
the  goods having the same expenditure share . The production technology is con­
stant returns to scale, and one unit of labor produces one unit of commodity. The market 
for each good is competitive. As firm size is not well defined in this environment, this 
model is silent on firm-size distribution. The critical assumption is that for a given net­
work structure, shipping a commodity  from city  to city  requires an iceberg transport 
cost such that the prices paid by consumers in  is given by
where  is the price paid by consumers at city  for good ,  is the iceberg cost fac­
tor by going one step from one node to a neighboring node, and  is the geodesic length 
between city  and , which is the number of steps along the shortest path between these 
two cities.
Define a city’s accessibility by , i.e., the negative of the average geodesic 
length of city . Berliant and Watanabe show that city size  is proportional to . Fur­
thermore, they show that accessibility  is a linear function in the logarithm of city i’s de­
gree . These imply a log-linear relationship between city size  and its degree , which 
is, in turn, log-linear in the rank of city  because the degree distribution follows a power 
law under any scale-free network. Thus, city size distribution also exhibits a power law. 
Interestingly, when transport cost  increases, the tail index of the city size distribution is 
(13)
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reduced, implying a fatter tail and a more dispersed/skewed distribution.13 That is, geog­
raphy plays a definitive role in explaining city size distribution—larger geographic barri­
ers lead to concentration of economic activities in a few cities.
Concluding Remarks
This article reviews several power-law phenomena related to trade and geography. It first 
reviews the theoretical literature on the gravity equation and concludes that the power 
law in firm size is a sufficient condition for the gravity equation to hold in a large set of 
trade models. These include all the ACR-class models with CES preferences as well as 
some trade models with non-CES homothetic, directly additive non-homothetic, and indi­
rectly additive non-homothetic preferences where the distribution of firm productivity fol­
lows a power law. The power law in aggregate trade is also shown by Arkolakis (2010) to 
be a good first-order approximation, even if the firm-level trade elasticity is heteroge­
neous due to endogenous choice of market access. Finally, Chaney (2018) identifies the 
model-free sufficient conditions for generating the gravity equation and demonstrates 
that these conditions are empirically plausible. Again, the power law in firm size is identi­
fied as a key condition. In contrast to this seemingly universal applicability of the gravity 
equation, the literature has arrived at the conclusion that welfare evaluation of gains 
from trade is not insensitive to the underlying model structures. In particular, non-homo­
thetic preferences and hence variable markups will alter the simple ACR welfare formula. 
Thus, the “social physics” does not extend to the normative domain.
We also review several important theories of firm-size distribution. The popular explana­
tion based on firm dynamics is discussed in detail, while static explanations based on net­
works (Chaney, 2014, 2018), hierarchical structure of firms (Geerolf, 2017), and innova­
tion (Chen et al., 2018) are also reviewed. Whereas Chaney’s theory generates both pow­
er laws in trade (gravity equation) and firm size, Geerolf (2017) explains both power laws 
in firm size and income, and the model of Chen et al. (2018) generates both power laws in 
productivity and firm size. Moreover, the central place theory in its modern form (Hsu, 
2012) explains both power laws in city size and firm size by a geographic fractal struc­
ture. These various theories advance understandings of the potential mechanisms behind 
the various power-law phenomena. The common theme across these theories is to deal 
with different aspects of agent heterogeneity in a neat way so that certain scale-free 
properties can emerge without imposing strict functional-form restrictions on the agent 
heterogeneity.
Recall that these power-law phenomena are important because: (1) they imply that top 
firms have significant influence on the macroeconomic performance (consistent with the 
granular economies phenomenon); and (2) related to the first point, the power-law coeffi­
cients are often tightly connected with welfare evaluation (as suggested by ACR and AC­
DR). Further, the validity of these power laws forms a strong justification for making pow­
erfunction assumptions in economic models, which make complex and large-scale quanti­
tative analysis possible.14 The recent development of quantitative analysis in both interna­
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tional and regional economics manifests this point (see, e.g., Costinot & Rodríguez-Clare, 
2015; Redding & Rossi-Hansberg, 2017, for surveys of these developments in the two re­
spective fields). With the aid of power-function assumptions, these quantitative analyses 
can often accommodate arbitrary numbers of countries, industries, goods, firms and 
workers, etc., and this high-dimensionality nature of quantitative analysis leads econo­
mists much closer to effective and meaningful policy evaluation than ever.
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Notes:
(1.) In the case of variable trade elasticity, the local welfare change formula of ACR may 
still be used:
For example, the local formula holds in Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015) and Feenstra 
and Weinstein (2017). Conceptually, one needs to obtain the elasticity at different levels 
of trade cost and integrate the right-hand side of the above equation over the relevant in­
terval of trade cost, to derive the discrete change in welfare.
(2.) Nevertheless, in the ACDR class, trade flows and trade elasticity remain sufficient 
statistics for welfare gains from trade, as in ACR.
(3.) A reflection barrier  is a lower bound such that  will remain where it is at time t if 
it encounters a negative shock that would move it below  without any interference.
(4.) Eeckhout (2004) argues that the log-normal distribution is a better description for the 
“entire” distribution of human settlements (not just cities). There is an ensuing debate 
about this. As Eeckhout (2004) uses the U.S. census places as cities (human settlements), 
it is unclear why census places are good proxies for cities. Rozenfeld et al. (2011) instead 
use an algorithm to identify population clusters in the United States with population data 
of fine resolution (census tracts) and argue that Zipf’s law still better describes the distri­
bution of the population cluster of more than 10,000 people. Regardless of the debate, 
the consensus of the literature is that the right tail of the city-size distribution is well ap­
proximated by a power law, whereas the entire distribution might be something else.
(5.) There is a similar doubt about the validity of Gibrat’s law for city growth. See, for ex­
ample, Redding and Sturm (2008) and Desmet and Rappaport (2017). In particular, Red­
ding and Sturm (2008) showed that a city’s growth rate depends on its “market poten­
tial,” which in turn depends on nearby cities’ sizes and growth. Hence, the growth rates 
of cities are not independently and identically distributed.
(6.) Also see the survey article Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2015).
(7.) A fractal structure is one in which the shape of the smaller parts of the structure re­
sembles that of the bigger one or the entire structure.
(8.) The name of the technique is given by Sornette (2006, Section 14.2.1).
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(9.) As is, the power-law change of variables technique is simply a mathematical one that 
allows explanation for the power laws (at the right tail) to be explained by the properties 
of some distributions near zero. Economics come in as to which mappings for such 
change of variables are plausible. As will be seen in Geerolf (2017), the right tail of firm- 
size distribution is mapped to the neighborhood where the fraction of problems that 
workers cannot solve becomes very small (origin). In Chen et al. (2018), it is mapped to 
the neighborhood where the failure probability of firms conducting R&D experiments be­
comes very small.
(10.) Beckmann (1958) showed how power law in city size emerges from a fractal struc­
ture of population and market area. However, his structure is assumed rather than de­
rived. He did not explain the power law in firm size either.
(11.) One drawback of this weak condition on density is that it approximates the two pow­
er laws at the left tail instead of the right tail. Nevertheless, the theory also provides a 
broader condition for the power laws. Namely, Proposition 2 states that if the sizes of the 
subranges  form approximately a geometric sequence, then the power laws 
emerge for the entire domain.
(12.) Note that whereas Hsu (2012) provided a theory explaining power laws as an equi­
librium phenomena, Hsu et al. (2014) showed how central place hierarchy and the power 
law in city size emerge as a socially optimal outcome. Nevertheless, since there is no 
clear definition of firms in a social planner’s problem, this study is silent on firm-size dis­
tribution.
(13.) This comparative statics in transport cost  is not specific to scale-free networks. It 
holds for all network structure. Also see Berliant and Watanabe (2015) for another formu­
lation to explain skewed distribution for city size.
(14.) Although Fréchet distribution is not a power function, it has a power law tail.
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